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The Schrodinger equation, which de-
scribes the deterministic evolution of
quantum states, usually predicts that
when subatomic particles interact with
a measurement device, the apparatus
"pointer" will be left in a so-called super-
position of states so that there is no matter
offact about what the measurement result
is. Yet experiments do have definite out-
comes: The macroscopic superpositions
quantum theory predicts seem never to be
observed. To be sure, the Schrodinger
equation yields excellent statistical predic-
tions for measurements results. Yet it can-
not explain the nondeterministic "col-
lapse" in the quantum state that seems to
be required for measurements to have def-
inite outcomes. InQuantum Mechanics and
Experience, David Albert critiques leading
attempts to solve this measurement prob-
lem and gives a good overall introduction
to the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics. Surprising stories about our psycho-
logical experiences arise when he applies
these interpretations of quantum mechan-
ic to belief states of sentient observers.
Yet Albert's storie seem to be at least as
much a product of trong physicalist and
reductionist theses as of the interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics he considers.
The focus of the book is introduced with
a lucid statement of the measurement
problem. But Albert pushes beyond tradi-
tional presentations by discussing the be-
lief states of a sentient observer. He argues
that the equations of quantum mechanics
predict that an observer's brain should be
in a superposition of belief states after a
measurement, a state in which there is no
matter of fact about what she believes. Yet
this is "at odds with what we know of our-
selves by direct introspection ... and so
things are turning out badly" otice,
though, that Albert assumes "that every-
thing in the world always evolves in ac-
cordance with the dynamical equations of
motion" of quantum mechanics, pace the
difficulties of precis ly how mental states
supervene on brain states, which he ad-
mits. Also, Albert's reductionism forces in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics to ac-
count for something that physical theories
are seldom required to explain: namely,
the belief states of sentient observers.
This is nowhere more apparent than in
his treatment of the Ghirardi-Rimini-We-
bel' (GRW) spontaneous collapse theory.
Albert uses a fictional thought experiment
to argue that, although an observer can be
functionally described as a knower of mea-
surement results, the GRW theory predicts
that the observer must be in a superpOSi-
tion of belief states and hence cannot truly
be a knower. Albert considers these good
reasons to reject not just the GRW theory
but all collapse theories. But until GRW are
given plausible reasons for believing that
brains can really generate belief states in
accord with Albert's simple quantum me-
chanical model (involving only a single
subatomic particle and a hypothetical
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brain implant') they are likely to deny the
force of the argument.
Albert sympathetically introduces the
Bolun theory as one of the best efforts to
solve the measurement problem-al-
though again he questions it because of its
inability to account for belief states and
knowledge claims. But, for Albert, "what's
so cool about this theory" is that it contains
nothing ambiguous or unintelligible and
"nothing metaphysically novel." In this
theory "the whole universe always evolves
deterministically" but conspires to appear
quantum mechanical. This is just one ex-
ample of where Albert's distinctive style
leads him to overstate his claim. There are
key elements of the Balun theory-such as
its sourceless quantum potential and the
contextualism of properties it implies,
which Albert himself later emphasizes-
without metaphysical counterparts in clas-
sical mechanics.
The book closes with a chapter on "self-
measurement" that contains even more "in-
teresting surprises" about the unimaginably
rich and private mental lives of quantum-
mechanical observers. There is also an ap-
pendix that attempts to refute modal inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics.
Quantum Mechanics and Experience will
appeal mostly to nonspecialists. Albert's
colloquial style makes the introductory
chapters less daunting than most other in-
troductions. His use of observables like
"hardness" and "color" to represent spin
observables is helpful to nonspecialists at
the outset. However, it conceals, until
much later in the book, that the particular
conception of properties, such as "hard"
and "soft," actually depends very much
on the interpretation being considered.
And for specialists, mock observables like
"scrad" and "zap" are distracting because
one is constantly wanting to translate
lengthy equations involving them into
standard spin notation. Although the con-
fabulation between the main text and the
footnotes (and the numerous parentheti-
cal remarks) is distracting, Albert's ener-
getic style makes the book a lively and
provocative read.-Francisco Flores and
Robert Cliftan, Philosophy, University of West-
ern Ontario
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